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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the effects of monetary policy on innovation and imitation in a North-South 
product-cycle model with foreign direct investment (FDI) and separate cash-in-advance (CIA) 
constraints on innovative R&D, adaptive R&D and imitative R&D. We find that if the CIA 
constraint is applied to innovative R&D, then an increase in the Northern nominal interest will raise 
the rate of Northern innovation and the extent of FDI while reducing the rate of Southern imitation 
and the North-South wage gap. Regarding the effects of the Southern monetary policy, the object 
that is liquidity-constrained plays a significant role. If adaptive (imitative) R&D is subject to the 
CIA constraint, then an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate will raise (reduce) the rate of 
Northern innovation and the extent of FDI while reducing (raising) the rate of Southern imitation. 
We also examine the responses of social welfare for Northern and Southern consumers to monetary 
policy. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Technological progress resulting from research and development (R&D) has allowed consumers to 
enjoy goods with better quality. Advances in technology also cause improvements in transportation, 
making international production through foreign direct investment (FDI) quite common nowadays. 
When considering the location of production, firms can choose to produce goods domestically or 
abroad as a means of saving costs. The availability of FDI allows monetary policy in one country to 
have cross-country influences due to the adjustment of the production pattern for firms in response 
to these policy changes. In this paper we investigate the long-run macroeconomic effects of 
monetary policy in a two-country model with FDI and quality improvements of goods. 
The macroeconomic effects of monetary policy have long been an important issue in 
macroeconomics. Based on a descriptive aggregate model, the pioneering paper of Tobin (1965) 
demonstrates that a higher money growth rate can positively affect the accumulation of physical 
capital due to the reduction in the real interest rate. Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985) develop a 
cash-in-advance (CIA) economy where consumption/investment is subject to the CIA constraint to 
analyze the impact of monetary policy. The CIA model subsequently undergoes various 
modifications in several studies that examine the effects of monetary policy on economic growth.1 
These studies focus on the effects of monetary policy on economic growth that depends on the 
accumulation of physical and human capital and ignore the impact on innovation resulting from 
R&D. However, the empirical evidence suggests that there is a significant relationship between 
R&D expenditures and cash flows (Hall, 1992; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999 and 
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Recently, several studies introduce the CIA-constrained property 
into an R&D model to examine the effects of monetary policy. However, most studies in this field 
tend to restrict their analysis to a closed economy and very few studies examine the cross-country 
effects of monetary policy. Based on a closed-economy product-cycle model, Chu and Cozzi (2012) 
and Huang, Chang and Ji (2014) look at how monetary policy affects the market structure and 
employment. A model with Northern and Southern countries is developed by Chu, Cozzi and 
Furukawa (2013) to analyze how monetary policy affects R&D and technology transfer via FDI. 
This paper introduces the CIA constraint into a North-South product-cycle model with 
technology transfer via FDI to examine the effects of monetary policy on innovation, imitation, and 
production pattern.2 Our product-cycle model presents innovative R&D in the North (a developed 
                                                 
1  For example, Suen and Yip (2005) show that indeterminacy may occur in a one-sector CIA model with an 
AK production function. A two-sector model with human capital accumulation and a CIA constraint is found 
in Marquis and Reffett (1991) and Mino (1997). Wang and Yip (1992) examine the impact of monetary policy 
under various monetary models. 
2  The North-South product-cycle model is originally introduced by Vernon (1966) and subsequently 
developed by Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b). 
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country), with adaptive R&D through FDI and imitative R&D in the South (a developing country). 
Innovation improves the quality of goods and Northern workers can work either in the R&D sector 
or in the production sector. Northern production firms choose either to carry out the entire 
production of the goods in the North or allow the goods to be produced through FDI in the South. 
Multinational firms produce products in the South through the use of state-of-the-art technologies 
(adaptive R&D) in order to take advantage of the lower Southern wage rate, but they face the risk of 
imitation by Southern firms. Southern firms can raise their rate of imitation (imitative R&D) by 
investing in imitation. Once Southern firms succeed at imitation, they are then able to use the 
state-of-the-art technologies to produce the highest quality products.  
There are two features of this paper. First, imitation is costly and the rate of imitation is 
endogenized. Previous theoretical studies related to R&D and imitation tend to assume that imitation 
is costless and the rate of imitation is exogenous. Although assuming that imitation is costless can 
simplify the analysis a lot, empirical studies find that imitation is in fact a costly process. By asking 
firms to estimate typical costs required to duplicate several categories of innovations if a competitor 
has developed them, Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) show that imitation is not free. Their 
survey data indicate that for a major unpatented new product, the cost of duplication is between 
fifty-one to seventy-five percent of the innovator’s R&D cost for more than half of firms.3 Using data 
from firms in the chemical, drug, electronics, and machinery industries, Mansfield, Schwartz and 
Wagner (1981) report that for 30 out of 48 products, the innovation cost exceeds $1 million, while for 
12 products, it exceeds $5 million. They also note that on average the ratio of the imitation cost to the 
innovation cost is about 0.65. Since the cost of imitation is significant, the assumption of costless 
imitation may be convenient for analysis, but it considerably departs from reality. Besides failing to 
reflect reality, the lack of an appropriate consideration of the nature of imitation may may not provide 
a complete picture for policy implications.4 
Second, R&D activities are subject to CIA constraints. Brown and Petersen (2009, 2011) argue 
that since R&D has high adjustment costs, it is very expensive for firms to adjust the flow of R&D 
in response to transitory finance shocks. They provide direct evidence that U.S. firms relied heavily 
on cash reserves to smooth R&D expenditure during the 1998-2002 boom and bust in stock market 
returns.5 Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) estimate a dynamic R&D model for high-tech firms 
                                                 
3  Patents tend to raise imitation costs. For a major patented new product, the cost of duplication is between 
seventy-six to one hundred percent of the innovator’s R&D cost for more than half of firms.  
4  For studies considering costly imitation, see Gallini (1992) and Chen (2014). Gallini (1992) develops a 
closed-economy model with costly imitation and finds that a rival’s decision to imitate depends on the length 
of patent protection awarded to the patentee. Chen (2014) examines the macro effects of the strengthening of 
intellectual property rights in developing countries in a North-South model with costly imitation. 
5  Brown, Martinsson and Petersen (2012) argue that information friction and the lack of collateral value 
make R&D more sensitive to financing frictions; thus, R&D-incentive firms tend to hold cash to prevent 
themselves from financing R&D investment though debt or equity. Using a large sample of European firms, 
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and find that cash holdings have a significant impact on R&D in young firms. Hall and Lerner (2010) 
show that in practice fifty percent or more of R&D spending goes to the wages and salaries of highly 
educated technology scientists and engineers. Because projects often take a long time between 
conception and commercialization and the departure of these highly educated workers will reduce a 
firm’s profits, firms tend to hold cash in order to smooth their R&D spending over time, in order to 
avoid having to lay off these workers. These findings suggest that innovative-firms are subject to 
cash constraints. Furthermore, Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) point out that innovators 
usually have a technological edge over their rivals in the relevant field. Often this edge is due to 
superior “know-how” - that is, better and more extensive technical information based on highly 
specialized experience with the development and production of related products. Thus, an imitator has 
to go through many of the same steps as an innovator. Their results suggest that an imitation-incentive 
firm, like an innovation-incentive firm, also relies on cash reserves to smooth its imitation spending 
due to high adjustment costs of imitation or the requirement for hiring highly educated workers. 
In order to capture the cash requirements faced by innovative-incentive and imitative-incentive 
firms, we consider three scenarios based on the setting of CIA constraints: a CIA constraint on 
innovative R&D in the North, a CIA constraint on adaptive R&D in the South, and a CIA constraint 
on imitative R&D in the South.6 While we examine the impact of the Northern monetary policy (an 
increase in the Northern nominal interest rate) in the first scenario, the impact of the Southern 
monetary policy (an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate) is considered in the second and 
third scenarios. In each scenario, besides looking at the effects of monetary policy on key variables 
such as the rate of Northern innovation, the rate of imitation and the pattern of production, we also 
examine its effect on social welfare for Northern and Southern consumers. 
In the first scenario where the CIA constraint is applied to innovative R&D in the North, an 
increase in the Northern nominal interest rate raises the rate of Northern innovation while reducing 
the rate of Southern imitation. Since the employment increase in the R&D sector crowds out 
Northern labor used in the production sector, Northern firms will shift production from the North to 
the South. As a result, the extent of Northern production will decrease and the extent of FDI will 
increase, inducing a reduction in the extent of Southern production. We also find that the 
North-South wage gap will fall and global expenditure will rise.   
Regarding the effects of the Southern monetary policy, our results indicate that the object that 
is liquidity-constrained plays a significant role. In the second scenario where adaptive R&D is 
CIA-constrained, an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate raises the rate of innovation while 
                                                                                                                                             
they find strong evidence that the availability of finance matters for R&D once they control firm efforts to 
smooth R&D with cash reserves and a firm’s use of external equity finance. 
6  Early theoretical studies, which suggest that R&D investment may be particularly constrained by cash flow, 
can be found in Leland and Pyle (1977) and Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983). 
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reducing the rate of imitation. Global expenditure will rise with an increase in the Southern nominal 
interest rate. The North-South wage gap is immune from the Southern monetary policy. However, in 
the third scenario where the CIA constraint is applied to imitative R&D, the reverse effects caused 
by an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate on the rates of Northern innovation and 
Southern imitation are found. The North-South wage gap is positively correlated with the Southern 
nominal interest rate while the change in global expenditure is ambiguous. 
Concerning the pattern of production, when the CIA constraint is applied to adaptive R&D, an 
increase in the Southern nominal interest rate will reduce the extents of both Northern and Southern 
production, causing an increase in the extent of FDI. When the CIA constraint is applied to imitative 
R&D, the extent of FDI will decrease with an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate. 
However, the responses of the extents of Northern and Southern production are ambiguous. In both 
cases, global expenditure will rise with an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate. 
In a closely-related paper, Chu, Cozzi and Furukawa (2013) find that changes in the Northern 
and Southern nominal interest rate may cause different effects on the rate of innovation, the 
North-South wage gap, and the rate of international technology transfer through FDI based on a 
North-South model where CIA constraints are applied to innovative and adaptive R&D. This paper 
differs from their study in two ways. First, the feature of semi-endogenous growth in their model 
implies that at the steady state, the innovation rate is determined by exogenous parameters and is 
immune from monetary policy.7 In this paper we remove the semi-endogenous growth feature and 
show that changes in the Northern (Southern) monetary policy can have long-run effects on the 
Northern innovation rate. Second, this paper considers imitation to be costly and the rate of imitation 
to be endogenized, whereas the rate of imitation is exogenous in their paper. Taking into account 
costly imitation endogenizes a rival’s imitation decisions and allows for the re-allocation of 
Southern labor between the production sector and the imitation sector in response to changes in 
monetary policy, thus generating different results from those obtained based on a model with an 
exogenous rate of imitation. Taking the effect of monetary policy on the rate of innovation when 
innovative R&D is CIA-constrained as an example, an increase in the Northern nominal interest rate 
will raise the cost of Northern innovation and cause a decrease in the rate of innovation if the rate of 
imitation is assumed to be exogenous. However, if the rate of imitation is endogenized, then an 
increase in the Northern nominal interest rate will also induce the re-allocation of Southern labor 
between the production sector and the imitation sector, causing a reduction in the North-South wage 
                                                 
7  They find that an increase in the Northern (Southern) nominal monetary policy induces only a temporary 
decrease in the rate of Northern innovation, leaving the long-run rate of Northern innovation unchanged. They 
also present that an increase in the Northern nominal interest rate generates a permanent decrease in the 
North-South wage gap and an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer, while an 
increase in the Southern nominal interest rate causes permanent decreases in the North-South wage gap and 
the rate of international technology transfer.  
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gap and an increase in the rate of Northern innovation. Therefore, the rate of innovation may 
increase or decrease, depending on which effect dominates. This indicates that, when considering any 
policy implication in an R&D model, we cannot ignore the important role of imitation. 
We finally examine the effects of monetary policy on social welfare for Northern and Southern 
consumers.8 We show that welfare for Northern (Southern) consumers is positively correlated with 
the rate of innovation and consumer’s expenditure in the North (South). In the first two scenarios, 
although increases in the nominal interest rate raise the innovation rate, which is beneficial to social 
welfare, the change in monetary policy may also cause a reduction in the Northern (Southern) 
consumer’s expenditure, which reduces welfare for Northern (Southern) consumers. When 
innovative R&D is subject to the CIA constraint, an increase in the Northern nominal interest rate 
will lead to a long-run welfare gain for Northern consumers if the Northern nominal interest rate and 
units of labor required for innovation are sufficiently large, but its effect on welfare for Southern 
consumers is ambiguous. When the CIA constraint is applied to adaptive R&D, an increase in the 
Southern nominal interest rate will raise both the rate of innovation and consumer’s expenditure in 
the North, generating a welfare gain for Northern consumers. But its effect on the welfare for 
Southern consumers is ambiguous. Besides, the effects of Southern monetary policy on the Northern 
and Southern welfare are ambiguous if imitative R&D is liquidity-constrained. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a North-South 
product-cycle model with three types of CIA constraint: the CIA constraint imposed on innovative 
R&D, adaptive R&D, or imitative R&D. Section 3 studies the effects of monetary policy under each 
type of CIA constraint. We also examine the social welfare for Northern and Southern consumers in 
this section. The final section concludes.  
2.  THE MODEL 
There exist a developed Northern country (N) and a developing Southern country (S). Each economy 
(݅ ൌ ሼܰ, ܵሽ) is comprised of ܮ௜  households. In every period, each Northerner (Southerner) is 
endowed with one unit of time and s/he spends all of the time at work to earn the real wage rate ݓே 
(ݓௌ). The wage rate of Southerners (ݓௌ) is normalized to 1, implying that the North-South wage gap 
(measured by the ratio of the Northern wage rate to the Southern wage rate) is represented by ݓே. 
Time ݐ is continuous, and we suppress the time index throughout the paper. 
2.1. Consumers  
The lifetime utility of the representative consumer in country ݅ is:      
                                                 
8  Pepall and Richards (1994) analyze the impact of the cost of copying relative to original development on 
social welfare based on a closed economy with innovation and imitation. 
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																																																																					 ௜ܷ ൌ න ݁ିఘ௧ ݈݋݃ ݑ௜ ݀ݐ,
∞
଴
																																																					ሺ1ሻ 
where ߩ denotes the subjective discount factor, and ݈݋݃ ݑ௜ is the instantaneous utility faced by a 
representative household. 
Consumers living in either countries care about both the quantity and quality of goods and can 
choose from a continuum of products ݖ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ available at different quality levels (݆). Each quality 
level ‘݆’ is better than quality level ‘݆ െ 1’ by ߣ times, where the size of the quality increment ߣ is 
constant and greater than 1. This implies that each product of quality ݆ provides quality ߣ௝. All 
products begin at time ݐ ൌ 0  with a quality level ݆ ൌ 0  and a base quality ߣ଴ ൌ 1 . The 
instantaneous utility faced by a representative household in country ݅ is: 
																																																							݈݋݃ ݑ௜ ൌ න ݈݋݃	቎෍ߣ௝ݍ௜௝ሺݖሻ
௝
቏
ଵ
଴
݀ݖ,																																															ሺ2ሻ 
where ݍ௜௝ሺݖሻ is the household consumption in country ݅ for quality level ݆ of product z at time ݐ.  
Each consumer supplies one unit of labor to earn a nominal wage ௜ܹ. The inter-temporal 
budget constraint faced by each consumer is:  
ܣపሶ ൅ ܯపሶ ൌ ݅௜ܣ௜ ൅ ݅௜ܤ௜ ൅ ௜ܹ ൅ ௜ܶ െ ௜ܲܧ௜,	     
where ܣ௜ is the nominal value of financial assets owned by each consumer, ܯ௜ is the nominal 
value of domestic currency held by each consumer, ௜ܲ is the price of goods denominated in units of 
domestic currency in country i, ܧ௜ is the real consumption per capita, ௜ܶ is the nominal value of 
lump-sum transfers from the government to each consumer, ݅௜ represents the nominal interest rate, 
and ܤ௜ is the real value of loans of domestic currency borrowed by firms for innovative R&D, 
adaptive R&D, or imitative R&D activities.9  
Let ݎ௜ represent the real interest rate and ߨ௜ represent the inflation rate. We then rewrite the 
inter-temporal budget constraint in real terms: 
ܽపሶ ൅ ݉పሶ ൌ ݎ௜ܽ௜ െ ߨ௜݉௜ ൅ ݅௜ܾ௜ ൅ ݓ௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ܧ௜,	               (3) 
where ܽ௜ is the real value of financial assets owned by each agent, ݉௜ represents the real value of 
domestic currency held by each household, ߬௜ is the real value of lump-sum transfers from the 
government to each consumer, ݓ௜ represents the real wage, and ܾ௜ represents the real value of 
loans of domestic currency borrowed by firms. Following Chu, Cozzi and Furukawa (2013), we 
assume that the CIA constraint faced by each agent is: 
                                                 
9  Following Chu, Cozzi and Furukawa (2013), we assume that Northern entrepreneurs need to borrow from 
Northern consumers to finance investments in innovative R&D and to borrow from Southern consumers to 
finance adaptive R&D (FDI). Furthermore, we assume that Southern firms may need to borrow from Southern 
consumers in order to finance investments in imitation. 
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ܾ௜ ൑ ݉௜.	                             (4) 
Equation (4) indicates that the real money balance ݉௜ held by the consumers is required in order to 
finance the firms’ investments in innovative R&D, adaptive R&D, or imitative R&D activities.10 
The total expenditure for all products with different quality levels under the real price ݌௜௝ሺݖሻ 
(denominated in units of goods) is: 
																																																														ܧ௜ ൌ න ቎෍݌௜௝ሺݖሻݍ௜௝ሺݖሻ
௝
቏ ݀ݖ,
ଵ
଴
																																															ሺ5ሻ 
The consumer’s problem is solved in three steps. First, the solution of the within-industry static 
optimization problem indicates that the expenditure for each product across available quality levels 
at each instant is allocated in a such way that consumers choose the quality that gives the lowest 
adjusted price, 
௣ೕሺ೥ሻ
ఒೕ . Thus, consumers are willing to pay ߣ for a single quality level improvement in 
a product.  
Second, consumers allocate expenditures across products at each instant. Note that the 
expenditure across all products will be the same since the elasticity of substitution between any two 
products is constant at unity. This leads to a global demand function for product ݖ of quality ݆ at 
time ݐ equal to ݍ௝ሺݖሻ ൌ ܧሺݐሻ/݌௝ሺݖሻ, where ܧ ൌ ܧேܮே ൅ ܧௌܮௌ represents global expenditure.  
Third and finally, consumers allocate lifetime wealth across time by maximizing lifetime utility 
subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint. This gives the optimal expenditure path for the 
representative agent in each country: 
																																																																									ܧሶ௜ܧ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ െ ߩ	.																																																																ሺ6ሻ 
We assume that there exists a global financial market, indicating that the real interest rates in the two 
countries must be the same - that is, ݎே ൌ ݎௌ ൌ ݎ. In this paper we focus on the equilibrium where 
ݎ௜ ൌ ߩ holds. 
2.2. Producers 
Innovation occurs only in the North and all existing products are the targets of innovation. Northern 
firms engaging in R&D activity hire skilled Northern workers and produce cutting-edge quality 
products through innovation. A Northern firm in industry ݖ engaged in innovation intensity ߶ோሺݖሻ 
will achieve one level of quality improvement in the final product with a probability ߶ோሺݖሻ݀ݐ for a 
time interval ݀ݐ. In order to achieve this, ܽோ߶ோሺݖሻ݀ݐ units of labor will be required at a total cost 
of ݓேܽோ߶ோሺݖሻ݀ݐ. In order to pay the wage for R&D employment, the Northern firms need to 
                                                 
10  See Huang, Chang and Ji (2014) for a model where consumer’s purchase of goods is cash constrained. 
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borrow Northern currency from the Northern consumers. The return of borrowing is the nominal 
interest rate ݅ே in the North. Let ݒே denote the expected discounted value of a Northern firm that 
has discovered a new product. To generate a finite rate of innovation, expected gains from 
innovation cannot exceed the costs, with equality being achieved when innovation occurs with 
positive intensity - that is: 
                 ݒே ൑ 	 ሺ1 ൅ ߤோ݅ேሻܽோݓே, 	߶ோ ൐ 0	⟺	ݒே ൌ 	 ሺ1 ൅ ߤோ݅ேሻܽோݓே,      (7) 
where ߤோ ൌ 0, 1. When ߤோ ൌ 1, the Northern firm investing in innovative R&D is subject to the 
CIA constraint. When ߤோ ൌ 0, the CIA constraint is not applied to the Northern firm’s investments 
in innovative R&D.  
After succeeding in innovating a higher-level quality product, a Northern firm can undertake its 
production in the North by hiring Northern workers or carry out its production in the South through 
FDI, lowering its costs by hiring Southern workers. In order to undertake its production in the South 
through FDI, a Northern firm needs to hire Southern workers to adopt the cutting-edge technology 
(adaptive R&D) in the South. Engaging in FDI intensity ߶ிሺݖሻ for a time interval, ݀ݐ, will require 
ܽி߶ிሺݖሻ݀ݐ  units of labor at a cost of ݓௌܽி߶ிሺݖሻ݀ݐ , with the probability of success being 
߶ிሺݖሻ݀ݐ. In order to pay the wage to Southern workers to facilitate FDI, the entrepreneurs need to 
borrow Southern currency from the Southern consumers, with the return of borrowing equal to the 
nominal interest rate ݅ௌ in the South. Let ሺݒி െ ݒேሻ represent capital gains from undertaking 
production in the South through FDI, and then we have: 
 ݒி െ ݒே ൑ ሺ1 ൅ ߤி݅ௌሻܽிݓௌ,				߶ி ൐ 0	⟺	ݒி െ ݒே ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߤி݅ௌሻܽிݓௌ,     (8) 
where ߤி ൌ 0, 1. When ߤி ൌ 1, adaptive R&D is subject to the CIA constraint. When ߤி ൌ 0, the 
CIA constraint is not applied to adaptive R&D.  
Although Northern firms undertaking production in the South through FDI can save production 
costs, they face the risk of imitation, which is denoted by ߶ௌ. A Southern firm engaged in imitation 
intensity ߶ௌሺݖሻ  for a time interval ݀ݐ  requires ܽௌ߶ௌሺݖሻ݀ݐ  units of labor. With the cost of 
ݓௌܽௌ߶ௌሺݖሻ݀ݐ, the Southern firm can successfully imitate the final product with a probability of 
߶ௌሺݖሻ݀ݐ. In order to pay the wage to Southern employment in the imitation sector, Southern firms 
need to borrow Southern currency from the Southern consumers, with the return of borrowing equal 
the Southern nominal interest rate ݅ௌ. Let ݒௌ be the expected gains of imitation, and then we have: 
                  ݒௌ ൑ 	 ሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻܽௌݓௌ,				߶ௌ ൐ 0	⟺	ݒௌ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻܽௌݓௌ	,       (9) 
where ߤௌ ൌ 0, 1. When ߤௌ ൌ 1, imitative R&D is subject to the CIA constraint. When ߤௌ ൌ 0, the 
CIA constraint is not applied to imitative R&D.  
Old technologies that designs have been improved are available internationally; therefore, 
Southern firms are able to produce final goods by using old technologies. Then Northern firms 
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which produce through the use of state-of-the-art technologies will charge the price equal to the size 
of the improvement in quality times the marginal cost of closest rivals since they possess a one 
quality level lead over the closest rivals; that is, ݌ ൌ ߣ (and make a sale ݍ ൌ ܧ/ߣ). Following 
Howitt (1999), we assume that once a Northern firm has exited the market, it will not reenter the 
market due to the costly maintaining costs of unused production and R&D facilities.11 We assume 
that that one unit of labor will be needed to produce one unit of the final product, regardless of the 
location of production. Then the cost of Northern firms completing one unit of final production in the 
North is ݓே while the cost of Southern firms completing one unit of final production in the South 
is 1. When successful at adapting its technology for Southern production, multinationals can earn a 
higher profit through by charging the price ݌ ൌ ߣ and hiring Southerners for production. To reflect 
the fact that multinationals face higher production costs relative to Southern firms, we assume that 
the unit labor requirement for multinational equals ߦ ൐ 1.12 
When successful at imitating the technology of multinationals, a Southern firm is able to 
capture the entire industry market by setting a price that is slightly lower than ߦ. As maintaining 
unused production and R&D facilities are costly, the Northern rival which has exited the market will 
not reenter, then the Southern firm will raise its price to ߣ. This price is the Nash equilibrium price 
since the Southern firm has no incentive to deviate from it and the presence of positive costs for 
unused production and R&D facilities ensures that the former Northern rival will not reenter the 
market. In equilibrium, only the highest quality level available will sell. 
The instantaneous profits for Northern production are:  
																																																													ߎே ൌ ܧߣ ሺߣ െ ݓேሻ.																																																								ሺ10ሻ 
When successful at adapting its technology for Southern production, a Northern firm can earn a 
higher profit by charging the price ݌ ൌ ߣ and hiring Southerners for production. The instantaneous 
profits for FDI are therefore:  
																																																															ߎி ൌ ܧߣ ሺߣ െ ߦሻ.																																																										ሺ11ሻ	 
When successful at imitating the technology of multinationals, a Southern firm can earn the same 
profits as multinationals: 
																																																																										ߎௌ ൌ ܧߣ ሺߣ െ 1ሻ.																																																											ሺ12ሻ	 
                                                 
11  Previous studies tend to assume that either it is free to reenter the market for both Northern and Southern 
firms (Glass and Saggi, 2002) or it is costly to reenter the market for both Northern and Southern firms 
(Parello, 2008). Since comparing with Southern firms (the imitators), it is more costly for Northern firms (the 
innovators) to maintain unused production and R&D facilities once they have exited the market, we then 
follow Howitt (1999) and assume that it is costly for innovators to reenter the market.  
12  The same setting of production cost for multinationals is also adopted by Glass and Saggi (2002) and 
Parello (2008). 
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The no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒே is: 
																																																																			ݎ ൌ ݒሶே ൅ ߎே െ ߶ோݒேݒே .																																																					ሺ13ሻ 
Equation (13) equates the real interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset for Northern 
production. The asset return includes (i) any potential capital gain ݒሶேሺݐሻ; (ii) profits of successful 
innovation; and (iii) the expected capital loss ሺെ߶ோݒேሻ from creative destruction. 
The no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒி is: 
																																																													ݎ ൌ ݒሶி ൅ ߎி െ ሺ߶ோ൅߶ௌሻݒிݒி .																																																	ሺ14ሻ 
Equation (14) equates the real interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset for FDI. The asset 
return is the sum of (i) any potential capital gain ݒሶிሺݐሻ; (ii) profits of a successful imitation; (iii) the 
expected capital loss ሺെ	߶ோݒிሻ from creative destruction; and (iv) the expected capital loss 
ሺെ	߶ௌݒிሻ from imitation. 
The no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒௌ is: 
																																																																					ݎ ൌ ݒሶௌ ൅ ߎௌ െ ߶ோݒௌݒௌ .																																																							ሺ15ሻ 
Equation (15) equates the real interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset for Southern 
production. The asset return is the sum of (i) any potential capital gain ݒሶௌ; (ii) profits of a successful 
imitation; and (iii) the expected capital loss ሺെ	߶ோݒௌሻ from creative destruction.  
2.3. Monetary authority 
The Northern (Southern) central bank (exogenously) decides the domestic nominal interest rate ݅ே 
(݅ௌ). Given the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate in the North (South) is endogenously 
determined by the Fisher equation - that is, ߨ௜ ൌ ݅௜ െ ݎ௜. Let ߟ௜ denote the growth rate of nominal 
money supply (ܯ௜), then ெഢሶெ೔ ൌ ߟ௜. This implies that the growth rate of the real money balance is 
௠ഢሶ
௠೔ ൌ ߟ௜ െ ߨ௜. The money growth rate is adjusted by the monetary authority in order to achieve the 
targeted nominal interest rate ݅௜ . The monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenues to 
consumers as a lump-sum transfer ߬௜ - that is, ߬௜ ൌ ߟ௜݉௜. 
2.4. Equilibrium 
Let ݊ே, ݊ி, and ݊ௌ respectively denote the proportion of products produced completely in the 
North (the extent of Northern production), the proportion of the goods for which production is 
carried out through FDI (the extent of FDI), and the proportion of products produced completely in 
the South (the extent of Southern production). The sum of these product measures should be one: 
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                               ݊ே ൅ ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌ ൌ 1.                          (16) 
At the steady-state equilibrium, the flows into FDI activities and Southern production equal the 
flows out of them: 
                               	߶ி݊ே ൌ ሺ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሻ݊ி,                      (17) 
                                  	߶ௌ݊ி ൌ ߶ோ݊ௌ.                          (18)	
Since Northern labor is used for the R&D sector and the production sector, the labor-market 
clearing condition for Northern labor is: 
																																																																								ܽோ߶ோ ൅ ݊ே ܧߣ ൌ ܮே.																																																							ሺ19ሻ 
Since Southern labor is used for the FDI sector of adapting cutting-edge technology, the imitation 
sector and the production sector, the labor-market clearing condition for Southern labor is: 
																																																										ܽி߶ி݊ே ൅ ܽௌ߶ௌ݊ி ൅ ሺ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌሻ ܧߣ ൌ ܮௌ.																															ሺ20ሻ 
Using the condition that ݎ ൌ ߩ and the assumption that ݒሶே ൌ ݒሶி ൌ ݒሶௌ ൌ 0, the no-arbitrage 
conditions of (13)-(15) can be expressed as: 
																																																																									ݒே ൌ ߎேߩ ൅ ߶ோ ,																																																													ሺ21ሻ 
																																																																					ݒி ൌ ߎிߩ ൅ ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌ ,																																																							 ሺ22ሻ 
																																																																										ݒௌ ൌ ߎௌߩ ൅ ߶ோ .																																																													ሺ23ሻ 
Substituting (7) and (10) into (21) gives us: 
																																																				ܧߣ ሺߣ െ ݓேሻ ൌ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻሺ1 ൅ ߤோ݅ேሻܽோݓே,																															ሺ24ሻ 
Substituting (7), (8), and (11) into (22) yields: 
																															ܧߣ ሺߣ െ ߦሻ ൌ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோ൅߶ௌሻሾሺ1 ൅ ߤோ݅ேሻܽோݓே ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߤி݅ௌሻܽிሿ.														ሺ25ሻ 
Substituting (9) and (12) into (23) yields: 
																																																						ܧߣ ሺߣ െ 1ሻ ൌ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻܽௌ.																																										ሺ26ሻ	
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by (16)-(20) and (24)-(26) with eight variables 
ሼݓே, ܧ, ݊ே, ݊ி, ݊ௌ, ߶ோ, ߶ி, ߶ௌሽ. Using (26), the global expenditure (ܧ) can be expressed as a function 
of R&D intensity (߶ோ): 
																																												ܧሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻ
ߣ െ 1 ,																																							ሺ27ሻ 
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with డாడథೃ ൌ
ா
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డா
డ௜ೄ ൌ
ఓೄா
ଵାఓೄ௜ೄ ൒ 0.  
From the no-arbitrage conditions of ݒே and ݒௌ (equations (24) and (26)), we have: 
																																																									ߣ െ ݓேߣ െ 1 ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ ߤோ݅ேሻܽோݓே
ሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻܽௌ .																																										ሺ28ሻ 
Using (28), we derive the Northern wage rate as: 
																																										ݓேሺ݅ே, ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ߤோ݅ேሻ.																										ሺ29ሻ 
To ensure that ݓே ൐ ݓௌ ൌ 1, we assume that ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤௌ݅ௌሻ ൐ ܽோሺ1 ൅ ߤோ݅ேሻ.  
Substituting (27) and (29) into the no-arbitrage condition of ݒி (equation (25)), we 
obtain: 
																																																			ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌߣ െ 1 ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ ൌ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሻߠ,																																						ሺ30ሻ 
where ߠ ൌ ߠሺ݅ே, ݅ௌሻ ൌ ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺଵାఓೃ௜ಿሻ௔ೄሺଵାఓೄ௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵାఓೃ௜ಿሻ ൅ ܽி
ଵାఓಷ௜ೄ
ଵାఓೄ௜ೄ  with 
డఏ
డ௜ಿ ൌ
ఒ௔ೄమ௔ೃሺଵାఓೄ௜ೄሻఓೃ
ሾ௔ೄሺଵାఓೄ௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵାఓೃ௜ಿሻሿమ ൒ 0  and 
డఏ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ఒ௔ೄమ௔ೃሺଵାఓೃ௜ಿሻఓೄ
ሾ௔ೄሺଵାఓೄ௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵାఓೃ௜ಿሻሿమ ൅ ܽி
ఓಷିఓೄ
ሺଵାఓೄ௜ೄሻమ . 
From (30), we now express ߶ௌ as a function of ߶ோ:  
																																				߶ௌሺ߶ோ; ݅ே, ݅ௌሻ ൌ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ே, ݅ௌሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ே, ݅ௌሻ ቉ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ,																	ሺ31ሻ 
with డథೄడథೃ ൌ
థೄ
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 , 
డథೄ
డ௜ಿ ൌ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ቀ
డఏ
డ௜ಿቁ ൑ 0 , and 
డథೄ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ቀ
డఏ
డ௜ೄቁ . We 
assume that parameter values satisfy 0 ൏ ߶ௌ ൏ 1. 
Substituting (27) into (19) yields: 
																																																						݊ேሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܧሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ሺܮே െ ܽோ߶ோሻ,																																							ሺ32ሻ 
with డ௡ಿడథೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డథೃቁ െ
ఒ௔ೃ
ா ൏ 0 and 
డ௡ಿ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డ௜ೄቁ ൑ 0.  
Using (16) and (17), we can respectively replace ሺ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌሻ and 	߶ி݊ே in (20) by (1 െ ݊ே) 
and ሺ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሻ݊ி and rewrite (20) as: 
																																																ܽிሺ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሻ݊ி ൅ ܽௌ߶ௌ݊ி ൅ ሺ1 െ ݊ேሻܧߣ ൌ ܮௌ.																													ሺ33ሻ 
Substituting (27), (31), and (32) into (33), we can rewrite (33) as an equation in ߶ோ and ݊ி: 
																									ܽிሾ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሺ߶ோሻሿ݊ி ൅ ܽௌ߶ௌሺ߶ோሻ݊ி ൅ ܧ
ሺ߶ோሻ
ߣ െ ሺܮே െ ܽோ߶ோሻ ൌ ܮௌ.												ሺ34ሻ 
Inserting (31) and (32) into (17), we can express ߶ி as a function of ߶ோ and ݊ி: 
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																																												߶ிሺ߶ோ, ݊ிሻ ൌ
ሾ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሺ߶ோሻሿ݊ி
݊ேሺ߶ோሻ .																																													ሺ35ሻ 
Inserting (32) into (16) yields: 
 ݊ௌሺ߶ோ, ݊ிሻ ൌ 1 െ ݊ேሺ߶ோሻ െ ݊ி.																																												ሺ36ሻ 
Combining (36) and (18) and using (31) and (32), we obtain: 
																																														ሾ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሺ߶ோሻሿ݊ி ൌ ߶ோሾ1 െ ݊ேሺ߶ோሻሿ.																																		ሺ37ሻ 
The equilibrium is represented by the two equations of (34) and (37), which can be used to 
implicitly solve for the equilibrium values of {߶ோ, ݊ி}. Once one derives the solution of {߶ோ, ݊ி}, 
the remaining endogenous variables can be solved accordingly. 
2.5. Social welfare 
One may wonder how monetary policy and the CIA constraint affect the long-run welfare for 
Northern and Southern consumers. To answer this question, we derive the steady-state level of social 
welfare in the North and in the South, which will be used to evaluate the welfare effects of monetary 
policy under different settings of the CIA constraint in the next section. Since consumers pay the 
price of ߣ for all goods produced by different wages, the average price is constant and equals: 
        ݌̅ ൌ ሺ݊ே ൅ ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌሻߣ ൌ ߣ. 
Because the expected number of innovations arriving in period t is ߶ோݐ, the instantaneous utility 
is: 
                         ݈݋݃ ݑ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݈݋݃ܧ௜ െ ݈݋݃݌̅ ൅ ߶ோݐ݈݋݃ߣ              
ൌ ݈݋݃ܧ௜ െ ݈݋݃ߣ ൅ ߶ோݐ݈݋݃ߣ.   
The lifetime utility can then be written as: 
																																																								 ௜ܷሺ0ሻ ൌ 1ߩ ൬݈݋݃ܧ௜ െ ݈݋݃ߣ ൅
߶ோ
ߩ ݈݋݃ߣ൰.																																				ሺ38ሻ 
To study the effect of monetary policy on the Northern (Southern) welfare, we differentiate (38) 
with respect to ݅௜ and obtain: 
																																																							݀ ௜ܷሺ0ሻ݀݅௜ ൌ
1
ߩ ൤
1
ܧ௜ ൬
݀ܧ௜
݀݅௜ ൰ ൅
݈݋݃ߣ
ߩ ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅௜ ൰൨.																																		ሺ39ሻ	
Since the average price is constant, monetary policy affects the Northern (Southern) welfare through 
two channels: ܧ௜ and ߶ோ. Equation (39) indicates that Northern (Southern) welfare is positively 
correlated with the quality of goods and consumer’s expenditure in the North (South). An increase in 
the rate of innovation allows consumers to enjoy a better quality of products, which is beneficial to 
the welfare of consumers worldwide. An increase in Northern (Southern) consumer’s expenditure 
allows Northern (Southern) consumers to buy more goods and this is beneficial to Northern 
(Southern) consumers.  
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We next need to determine the effects of monetary policy on the rate of innovation and 
Northern (Southern) consumer’s expenditure. Note that the rate of innovation is determined by 
equations (34) and (37). Since ெഢሶெ೔ ൌ ߨ௜ ൅
௠ഢሶ
௠೔ , we thus have ߬௜ ൌ ߟ௜݉௜ ൌ
ெഢሶ
ெ೔ ݉௜ ൌ ߨ௜݉௜ ൅ ݉పሶ . 
Substituting this into the inter-temporal budget constraint (equation (3)), the initial Northern 
(Southern) consumer’s expenditure at the steady state can be derived as: 
ܧ௜ ൌ ߩܽ௜ ൅ ݅௜ܾ௜ ൅ ݓ௜.                        (40) 
Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) and Chu, Cozzi and Furukawa (2013), we 
assume that the Northern household receives dividends equal to the flow of global profits earned by 
Northern quality leaders, as well as the flow of global profits from foreign affiliates - that is: 
ܽே ൌ ሺ݊ே ൅ ݊ிሻݒேܮே ൌ
ሺ݊ே ൅ ݊ிሻܽோݓே
ܮே . 
Note that ܾே represents the money borrowed by Northern firms from the household in order to 
finance the labor cost in innovative R&D. This implies that ܾே ൌ ఓೃథೃ௔ೃ௪ಿ௅ಿ . Therefore, ܾே ൌ
థೃ௔ೃ௪ಿ
௅ಿ  if the CIA constraint is applied to innovative R&D and ܾே ൌ 0 otherwise. Substituting ܽே 
and ܾே into (40) for ݅ ൌ ܰ and using (16), we can express the Northern consumer’s expenditure 
as follows: 
ܧே ൌ ቊ
ܴܽሾߩሺ݊ܰ ൅ ݊ܨሻ ൅ ߤܴ݅ܰ߶ܴሿ
ܮܰ ൅ 1ቋݓܰ 
																																																			ൌ ቊܴܽሾߩሺ1 െ ݊ܵሻ ൅ ߤܴ݅ܰ߶ܴሿܮܰ ൅ 1ቋݓܰ.																																ሺ41ሻ 
Substituting (41) into (38) yields: 
									ܷேሺ0ሻ ൌ 1ߩ ቆ݈݋݃ ቊ
ܽோሾߩሺ1 െ ݊ௌሻ ൅ ߤோ݅ே߶ோሿ
ܮே ൅ 1ቋ ൅ ݈݋݃ݓே െ ݈݋݃ߣ ൅
߶ோ
ߩ ݈݋݃ߣቇ.					ሺ42ሻ 
Equation (42) indicates that monetary policy and the CIA constraint will affect the Northern welfare 
through three channels: ݊ௌ, ߶ோ, and ݓே. Once the Northern consumer’s expenditure has been 
derived, the Southern consumer’s expenditure can derived from the definition of global expenditure 
- that is, ܧௌ ൌ ாିாಿ௅ಿ௅ೄ . The Southern welfare then becomes:	
																																				 ௌܷሺ0ሻ ൌ 1ߩ ൬logሺܧ െ ܧேܮேሻ െ ݈݋݃ܮௌ െ ݈݋݃ߣ ൅
߶ோ
ߩ ݈݋݃ߣ൰.																					ሺ43ሻ 
3. MONETARY POLICY 
We are now ready to examine the effects of monetary policies under three scenarios based on the 
setting of the CIA constraint. In each case, we first analyze the effects of monetary policy on key 
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macroeconomic variables, following the analysis of the effects on social welfare for Northern and 
Southern consumers. 
3.1. A CIA constraint on innovative R&D 
We start from considering the scenario where innovative R&D is subject to the CIA constraint. This 
corresponds to the parameter values of ߤோ ൌ 1 and ߤி ൌ ߤௌ ൌ 0. Equation (27) becomes: 
																																																						ܧሺ߶ோሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ
ߣ െ 1 ,																																																							ሺ44ሻ 
with డாడథೃ ൌ
ா
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0.  
Equation (28) becomes:  
																																																										ݓேሺ݅ேሻ ൌ ߣܽௌܽௌ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ேሻ.																																							ሺ45ሻ 
Equation (45) indicates that the Northern wage depends only on ݅ே and is independent of ߶ோ.  
Equation (31) becomes: 
																																																										݊ேሺ߶ோሻ ൌ ߣܧሺ߶ோሻ ሺܮே െ ܽோ߶ோሻ,																																														ሺ46ሻ 
with డ௡ಿడథೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డథೃቁ െ
ఒ௔ೃ
ா ൏ 0. Equations (44) and (46) indicate that with the CIA constraint 
applied to innovative R&D, the Northern nominal interest rate does not directly affect global 
expenditure and the extent of Northern production. However, it affects global expenditure and the 
extent of Northern production indirectly by influencing the rate of innovation. 
Equation (31) becomes:  
																																																߶ௌሺ߶ோ; ݅ேሻ ൌ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ேሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ேሻ ቉ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ,																	ሺ47ሻ 
where ߠ ൌ ߠሺ݅ேሻ ൌ ܽி ൅ ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺଵା௜ಿሻ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻ  with 
డఏ
డ௜ಿ ൌ
ఒ௔ೃ௔ೄమ
ሾ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻሿమ ൐ 0 . Furthermore, we 
also obtain డథೄడథೃ ൌ
థೄ
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డథೄ
డ௜ಿ ൌ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ቀ
డఏ
డ௜ಿቁ ൏ 0. 
We are now ready to examine the effects of an increase in ݅ே. Since the equilibrium is 
represented by the two equations of (34) and (37) in {߶ோ, ݊ி}, then we totally differentiate (34) and 
(37) with respect to ߶ோ, ݊ி, and ݅ே. As revealed in Appendix A, both equations are affected by an 
increase in ݅ே. Appendix A shows that ௗథೃௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0 and 
ௗ௡ಷ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0,
 indicating that an increase in ݅ே 
raises both the rate of innovation and the extent of FDI.  
An increase in the Northern nominal interest rate causes two opposite effects on the rate of 
innovation. First, the increase in the Northern nominal interest rate raises the cost of innovation and 
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reduces the rate of innovation. Second, the no-arbitrage conditions of ݒே and ݒௌ indicate that 
௪ಿ
ఒି௪ಿ ൌ
௔ೄ
௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻ (equation (28)). This condition implies that there is a negative relationship 
between ݓே  and ݅ே  - that is, ௗ௪ಿௗ௜ಿ ൌ െ
ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ
ሾ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻሿమ ൏ 0 . Therefore, an increase in ݅ே 
reduces the North-South wage gap. Since the Northern labor becomes relatively cheaper, the 
demand for Northern labor in the innovative R&D sector will increase and this will raise the rate of 
innovation. Appendix A shows that the second effect dominates the first effect and there is an 
overall increase in the rate of innovation.13 
The increase in the rate of innovation will raise global expenditure as indicated by (44). With 
increases in the rate of innovation and global expenditure, the labor-market clearing condition for 
Northern labor (equation (19)) implies that there will be a decrease in the extent of Northern 
production, causing an increase in the extent of FDI. The increase in the Southern labor employed 
by foreign affiliates crowds out employment in the production sector and the imitation sector for 
Southern firms, resulting in decreases in the extent of Southern production and the rate of imitation. 
However, the increase in the rate of innovation means that there will be more newly innovated goods 
to be imitated and this will raise the rate of imitation. As demonstrated by (47), besides the direct 
effect of ݅ே, there will be an indirect effect of ݅ே on ߶ௌ through the channel of ߶ோ. We find that 
there will be overall decrease in the rate of imitation. Finally, equation (35) indicates that the change 
of FDI intensity is ambiguous. We summarize our findings in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. With a CIA constraint applied to innovative R&D, an increase in the nominal interest 
rate in the North causes (a) a decrease in the North-South wage gap; (b) an increase in global 
expenditure; (c) an increase in the rate of innovation; (d) a decrease in the rate of imitation; and (e) 
an ambiguous change in FDI intensity. Concerning the production pattern, the extents of Northern 
and Southern production will decrease while the extent of FDI will increase. 
Proof.   See Appendix A. 
Equation (39) demonstrates that the change in the Northern monetary policy will affect the 
welfare for Northern (Southern) consumers by impacting ܧே (ܧௌ) and ߶ோ. Equation (41) indicates 
that ܧே ൌ ቄ௔ೃሾఘሺଵି௡ೄሻା௜ಿథೃሻሿ௅ಿ ൅ 1ቅݓே when innovative R&D is CIA-constrained. This implies that 
an increase in ݅ே will affect ܧே through the three channels of ݊ௌ, ߶ோ, and ݓே. The decrease in 
                                                 
13  In a model where imitation is costless and the rate of imitation is assumed to be exogenous, there is no 
need to consider the no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒௌ and there is no second effect. Therefore, an 
increase in the Northern nominal interest rate will reduce the rate of innovation. 
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݊ௌ and the increase in ߶ோ will raise ܧே while the decrease in ݓே will reduce ܧே. Therefore, ܧே 
may increase or decrease, depending on which effect dominates. In Appendix B we show that if ݅ே 
and ܽோ are sufficiently large, then the positive effects will outweigh the negative effect and there 
will be an overall increase in ܧே . With increases in ܧே  and ߶ோ , the welfare for Northern 
consumers will increase.  
Proposition 2. With a CIA constraint applied to innovative R&D, an increase in the Northern 
nominal interest rate will raise the expenditure and the welfare for Northern consumers if ݅ே and 
ܽோ are sufficiently large.  
Proof.   See Appendix B. 
From the definition of global expenditure, the consumer’s expenditure in the South can be 
derived as ܧௌ ൌ ாିாಿ௅ಿ௅ೄ .  Under the assumption of a sufficiently large ݅ே, an increase in ݅ே will 
raise both ܧ and ܧே, leading to an ambiguous change in ܧௌ. Accordingly, the change in the 
welfare of Southern consumers is ambiguous. If there is an overall increase in ܧௌ, then the welfare 
of Southern consumers will increase. 
3.2. A CIA constraint on adaptive R&D 
We now turn to investigate the effects of an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate. We first 
consider the scenario where the CIA constraint is applied to adaptive R&D. This corresponds to the 
parameter values of ߤி ൌ 1 and ߤோ ൌ ߤௌ ൌ 0. Global expenditure is the same as the one in (44) 
and the extent of Northern production is the same as the one in (46).  
Note that ݓே is derived from the no-arbitrage conditions of ݒே and ݒௌ (equations (24) and 
(26)). Because only adaptive R&D is CIA-constrained, these two equations are not directly affected 
by ݅ௌ. From (29), we obtain a constant North-South wage gap:  
																																																																				ݓே ൌ ߣܽௌܽௌ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ.																																																					ሺ48ሻ 
Equation (31) becomes:  
																																													߶ௌሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ ቉ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ,																						ሺ49ሻ 
where ߠ ൌ ߠሺ݅ௌሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻܽி ൅ ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ  with 
డఏ
డ௜ೄ ൌ ܽி ൐ 0 . Furthermore, we also have 
డథೄ
డథೃ ൌ
థೄ
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డథೄ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄ௔ಷሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ൏ 0.  
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To study the effects of ݅ௌ, we totally differentiate (34) and (37) with respect to ߶ோ, ݊ி, and ݅ௌ. 
In Appendix B we show that ௗథೃௗ௜ೄ ൐ 0 and 
ௗ௡ಷ
ௗ௜ೄ ൐ 0, indicating that an increase in ݅ௌ raises both 
the rate of innovation and the extent of FDI. An increase in the Southern nominal interest rate raises 
the cost of FDI and reduces the extent of FDI. Since Southern firms only imitated products produced 
by foreign affiliates, the reduced extent of FDI implies that fewer products are targeted for imitation, 
causing an increase in the rate of innovation. With more Northern workers employed in the R&D 
sector, fewer Northern workers are available for the production sector, leading to a decrease in the 
extent of Northern production and an increase in the extent of FDI. We find that overall, there will 
be an increase in the extent of FDI. The increase in the Southern labor employed by foreign affiliates 
means that fewer Southern workers are released from the FDI sector, resulting in a reduction in the 
extent of Southern production.  
Combining the no-arbitrage conditions of ݒே  and ݒௌ , equation (29) indicates that the 
North-South wage gap can be expressed as in (48) and is immune from Southern monetary policy. 
Equation (49) implies that an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate affects the rate of 
imitation by influencing ߠሺ݅ௌሻ and ߶ோ. Given the fact that ݅ௌ does not directly affect ݓே and ܧ,  
the no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒி  (equation (25)) implies that a higher ݅ௌ  ceteris 
paribus reduces ߶ௌ  - that is, డథೄడ௜ೄ ൏ 0 as indicated by (49). However, the increased rate of 
innovation caused by an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate means that there are more 
products to be imitated, implying an increase in the rate of imitation - that is, డథೄడథೃ ൐ 0 as indicated 
by (49). We find that there will be an overall decrease in the rate of imitation. In fact, the higher rate 
of innovation generates higher global expenditure as indicated by (44). Similar to the previous case, 
the change in FDI intensity is ambiguous. The following proposition summarizes these results. 
Proposition 3. With a CIA constraint applied to adaptive R&D, an increase in the nominal interest 
rate in the South causes (a) an increase in global expenditure; (b) an increase in the rate of 
innovation; (c) a decrease in the rate of imitation; and (d) an ambiguous change in FDI intensity. 
The North-South wage gap is not affected by Southern monetary policy. Concerning the production 
pattern, such monetary policy will reduce in the extents of Northern production and FDI while 
raising the extent of Southern production. 
Proof.   See Appendix C. 
To examine the change in welfare for Northern and Southern consumers in response to an 
increase in the Southern nominal interest rate, we first use (41) to study the change of Northern 
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consumer’s expenditure. When the CIA constraint is applied to adaptive R&D, the Northern 
consumer’s expenditure becomes ܧே ൌ ቂ௔ೃఘሺଵି௡ೄሻ௅ಿ ൅ 1ቃݓே. Since ݓே is constant, then a decrease 
in ݊ௌ caused by an increase in ݅ௌ will lead to an increase in ܧே. Since both ܧே and ߶ோ increase, 
the Northern welfare will increase.  
Proposition 4. With a CIA constraint applied to adaptive R&D, an increase in the nominal interest 
rate in the South will raise the Northern consumer’s expenditure and the welfare for Northern 
consumers.  
Proof.   See Appendix D. 
With both increases in E and ܧே, an increase in ݅ௌ will cause an ambiguous change in ܧௌ, 
because ܧௌ ൌ ாିாಿ௅ಿ௅ೄ . Therefore, the change of the welfare for Southern consumers will be 
ambiguous. Similar to the previous case, if there is an overall increase in ܧௌ, then the welfare of 
Southern consumers will increase. 
3.3. A CIA constraint on imitative R&D 
We finally investigate the effects of an increase in ݅ௌ when the CIA constraint is applied to 
imitative R&D. This corresponds to the parameter values of ߤௌ ൌ 1 and ߤோ ൌ ߤி ൌ 0. From 
(27), global expenditure becomes:	
																																																						ܧሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ
ߣ െ 1 ,																																													ሺ50ሻ 
with డாడథೃ ൌ
ா
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డா
డ௜ೄ ൌ
ா
ଵା௜ೄ ൐ 0.  
Equation (29) becomes: 
																																																													ݓேሺ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ.																																						ሺ51ሻ 
Equation (32) becomes: 
																																																									݊ேሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܧሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ሺܮே െ ܽோ߶ோሻ,																																				ሺ52ሻ 
with డ௡ಿడథೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డథೃቁ െ
ఒ௔ೃ
ா ൏ 0 and 
డ௡ಿ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డ௜ೄቁ ൏ 0. Equations (51) and (52) imply that 
besides causing direct effects, an increase in ݅ௌ also directly influences ܧ and ݊ே through its 
effect on ߶ோ. 
Equation (31) becomes:  
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																																						߶ௌሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ ቉ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ,																													ሺ53ሻ 
where ߠ ൌ ߠሺ݅ௌሻ ൌ ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ ൅
௔ಷ
ଵା௜ೄ  with 
డఏ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ఒ௔ೄమ௔ೃ
ሾ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሿమ െ
௔ಷ
ሺଵା௜ೄሻమ ൏ 0 . 
Furthermore, we also have డథೄడథೃ ൌ
థೄ
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డథೄ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ቀ
డఏ
డ௜ೄቁ ൐ 0.  
Totally differentiating (34) and (37) with respect to ߶ோ, ݊ி, and ݅ௌ, we show that ௗథೃௗ௜ೄ ൏ 0 
and ௗ௡ಷௗ௜ೄ ൏ 0 in Appendix C. These results imply that an increase in ݅ௌ reduces both the rate of 
innovation and the extent of FDI.  
Using the no-arbitrage conditions of ݒே  and ݒௌ  (equation (28)), we can derive the 
North-South wage gap as given in Equation (51). It indicates that the North-South wage gap will 
increase with a rise in the Southern nominal interest rate since ௗ௪ಿௗ௜ೄ ൌ
ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ
ሾ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሿమ ൐ 0. The 
increase in the North-South wage gap will reduce labor employment in the R&D sector in the North, 
causing the rate of Northern innovation to decrease. As shown by (50), an increase in the Southern 
nominal interest rate raises global expenditure directly, but a decrease in the rate of innovation 
reduces global expenditure indirectly. Therefore, the change in global expenditure is ambiguous. 
From the no-arbitrage condition of ݒி (equation (25)), an increase in the Southern nominal 
interest rate will cause a direct increase in the rate of imitation - that is, డథೄడ௜ೄ ൐ 0 as indicated by 
(53). However, the reduced rate of innovation caused by an increase in the Southern nominal interest 
rate means that there are fewer products to be imitated, implying a reduction in the rate of imitation - 
that is, డథೄడథೃ ൐ 0 as indicated by (53). In Appendix E we show that if ߦ is sufficiently large, then 
the positive effect caused by ݅ௌ outweighs the negative effects and there will be overall increases in 
the rate of imitation. Although the increase in the North-South wage gap may reduce the extent of 
Northern production while encouraging FDI activities, the increase in demand for Southern labor in 
the imitation sector crowds out Southern labor employed in the FDI sector and in the Southern 
production sector, causing a reduction in the extent of FDI and an increase in the extent of Northern 
production. Our calculation in Appendix E demonstrates that if ߦ is sufficiently large and ܽோ ൐ ܽி, 
then the extent of FDI will decrease while the change of the extent of Northern production is 
ambiguous. With the ambiguous change in the extent of Northern production, we are not able to 
determine the change in the extent of Southern production and FDI intensity. The following 
proposition summarizes these results. 
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Proposition 5. Suppose ߦ is sufficiently large and ܽோ ൐ ܽி. Then with a CIA constraint applied to 
imitative R&D, an increase in the nominal interest rate in the South will cause (a) an increase in the 
North-South wage gap; (b) a decrease in the rate of innovation; (c) an increase in the rate of 
imitation; and (d) ambiguous changes in global expenditure and FDI intensity. Concerning the 
production pattern, such a monetary policy will reduce the extent of FDI, leaving the changes of the 
extents of Northern and Southern production ambiguous. 
Proof.   See Appendix E. 
When the CIA constraint is applied to imitative R&D, the Northern consumer’s expenditure 
can expressed as ܧே ൌ ቂܴܽఘሺ1െ݊ܵሻܮܰ ൅ 1ቃݓܰ. Since an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate 
will cause ambiguous effects on ݊ௌ, the change of ܧே is ambiguous; thus, we are not able to 
determine the change in welfare for Northern consumers. Due to the ambiguous change in ܧே, the 
change of ܧௌ is also ambiguous and we are not able to determine the change in welfare for 
Southern consumers. Note that in this case, an increase in the Southern nominal interest rate will 
reduce the rate of Northern innovation. If this change in the monetary policy reduces ܧே (ܧௌ), then 
it will reduce the welfare for Northern (Southern) consumers. 
4.  CONCLUSION  
In this paper we examine the effects of monetary policy on innovation, imitation, the North-South 
wage gap, and the pattern of production based on a product-cycle model with CIA constraints 
applied to innovative R&D, adaptive R&D and imitative R&D. Our analysis reveals that the effects 
of monetary policy on these variables and social welfare for Northern and Southern consumers 
depend on the object of the CIA constraint.  
When the CIA constraint is applied to innovative R&D, an increase in the Northern nominal 
interest rate will raise the rate of Northern innovation while reducing the rate of Southern imitation. 
Global expenditure will increase while the North-South wage gap and the extent of Northern 
production will decrease. We find that an increase in the Southern nominal interest will cause the 
same effect on the rates of innovation and imitation, global expenditure, and the pattern of 
production when adaptive R&D is subject to the CIA constraint. When the CIA constraint is applied 
to imitative R&D, the rate of innovation will decrease and the rate of imitation will increase with an 
increase in the Southern nominal interest rate. This change in monetary policy will result in a 
decrease in the extent of FDI, leaving the change in the extents of Northern and Southern production 
ambiguous. Table 1 summarizes these results. 
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Concerning social welfare for Northern (Southern) consumers, we find that the Northern 
(Southern) welfare depends on Northern (Southern) consumer’s expenditure and the rate of 
innovation. Assuming that the Northern household receives dividends equal to the flow of global 
profits earned by Northern quality leaders, as well as the flow of global profits from foreign 
affiliates, the Northern consumer’s expenditure depends positively on the North-South wage gap and 
negatively on the extent of Southern production. Given that changes in monetary policy will cause 
various effects on the North-South wage gap, the extent of Southern production, and the rate of 
innovation, changes in the Northern and Southern welfare may be ambiguous. We show that under 
certain conditions, the welfare for Northern consumers will increase with an increase in the Northern 
nominal interest rate when innovative R&D is subject to the CIA constraint. Besides, a rise in the 
Southern nominal interest rate will also raise the welfare for Northern consumers when adaptive 
R&D is CIA-constrained.  
We point out two directions for future study. In this paper, labor supply is assumed to be 
inelastic and the CIA constraint is not applied to household expenditure. It would be interesting to 
extend our model by endogenizing labor supply or by assuming that household expenditure is 
subject to the CIA constraint in order to examine the robustness of the results found in this paper. 
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Table 1  The effects of monetary policy 
 
 
CIA on R&D 
ሺߤோൌ1,	 ߤிൌ0,	 ߤௌൌ0ሻ 
 CIA on FDI 
ሺߤோൌ0,	 ߤிൌ1,	 ߤௌൌ0ሻ 
CIA on Imitation 
ሺߤோൌ0,	 ߤிൌ0,	 ߤௌൌ1ሻ 
݅ே↑  ݅ௌ↑ ݅ௌ↑ 
ݓே ↓  → ↑ 
ܧ  ↑  ↑ N/A 
߶ோ ↑  ↑ ↓ 
߶ி N/A  N/A N/A 
߶ௌ ↓  ↓ ↑ 
݊ே ↓  ↓ N/A 
݊ி ↑  ↑ ↓ 
݊ௌ ↓  ↓ N/A 
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APPENDIX A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
In this case, we have ߤோ ൌ 1 and ߤி ൌ ߤௌ ൌ 0. Equation (27) becomes: 
																																																			ܧሺ߶ோሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ
ߣ െ 1 ,																																																ሺA1ሻ 
with డாడథೃ ൌ
ா
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0. Equation (29) becomes:  
																																																						ݓேሺ݅ேሻ ൌ ߣܽௌܽௌ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ேሻ,																																						ሺA2ሻ 
where ௗ௪ಿௗ௜ಿ ൌ െ
ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ
ሾ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻሿమ ൌ െ
௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ௪ಿ
௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻ ൏ 0. 
In this case, we have ߠ ൌ ߠሺ݅ேሻ ൌ ܽி ൅ ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺଵା௜ಿሻ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻ  and 
డఏ
డ௜ಿ ൌ
ఒ௔ೃ௔ೄమ
ሾ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻሿమ ൐ 0. From (31), we then obtain: 
																														߶ௌሺ߶ோ; ݅ேሻ ൌ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ேሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ேሻ ቉ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ,																										ሺA3ሻ 
where డథೄడథೃ ൌ
థೄ
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డథೄ
డ௜ಿ ൌ െ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ቀ
డఏ
డ௜ಿቁ ൏ 0.  
Equation (32) becomes: 
																																																								݊ேሺ߶ோሻ ൌ ߣܧሺ߶ோሻ ሺܮே െ ܽோ߶ோሻ,																																							ሺA4ሻ 
where డ௡ಿడథೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డథೃቁ െ
ఒ௔ೃ
ா ൏ 0. 
To examine the effects of an increase in ݅ே, we totally differentiate (34) and (37) with 
respect to ߶ோ, ݊ி, and ݅ே to obtain: 
1 2 1
3 4 2
R
N
F
B
b b d
di
b b d
e
en
            
,               (A5) 
where ܾଵ ൌ ݊ி ቂሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ ቀ߲థೄ߲థೃቁ ൅ ܽிቃ ൅
ଵ
ఒ ቀ
߲ா
߲థೃቁ ൅ ܽோ ൐ 0 , ܾଶ ൌ ሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ߶ௌ ൅ ܽி߶ோ ൐ 0 ,  
ܾଷ ൌ ݊ி ቀ1 ൅ ߲థೄ߲థೃቁ െ ሺ1 െ ݊ேሻ ൅ ߶ோ ቀ
߲௡ಿ
߲థೃቁ ൌ ݊ி ቀ
߲థೄ
߲థೃቁ െ ݊ௌ ൅ ߶ோ ቀ
߲௡ಿ
߲థೃቁ ൏ 0 , ܾସ ൌ ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌ ൐
0, ݁ଵ ൌ ݊ிሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ ቀ߲థೄ߲݅ܰ ቁ ൏ 0, and ݁ଶ ൌ ݊ி ቀ
߲	థೄ
߲݅ܰ ቁ ൏ 0. 
Note that the determinant of ܤ is negative since |ܤ| ൌ ܾଵܾସ െ ܾଶܾଷ ൏ 0. Using (A5), the 
effects of changes in ݅ே on ߶ோ and ݊ி are: 
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																																																															݀߶ோ݀݅ே ൌ െ
ܾସ݁ଵ െ ܾଶ݁ଶ
|ܤ| ,																																																ሺA6ሻ 
																																																																݀݊ி݀݅ே ൌ െ
ܾଵ݁ଶ െ ܾଷ݁ଵ
|ܤ| .																																																ሺA7ሻ 
With a few steps of calculation, we obtain that ሺܾସ݁ଵ െ ܾଶ݁ଶሻ ൌ െܽௌ߶ோ݊ி ቀ߲థೄ߲݅ܰ ቁ ൐ 0, indicating 
that ௗథೃௗ௜ೄ ൐ 0. With a few steps of calculation, we can derive that ሺܾଵ݁ଶ െ ܾଷ݁ଵሻ ൌ ݊ி ቄെሺܽௌ ൅
ܽிሻ ቀ߲థೄ߲݅ܰ ቁ ቂ݊ௌ െ ߶ோ ቀ
߲௡ಿ
߲థೃቁቃ െ ቂܽி݊ி ൅
ଵ
ఒ ቀ
߲ா
߲థೃቁ ൅ ܽோቃ ቀ
߲థೄ
߲݅ܰ ቁቅ ൐ 0, indicating that 
ௗ௡ಷ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0.  
We now turn to examine the effects of ݅ே on other variables. From (A2), we derive that 
ௗ௪ಿ
ௗ௜ಿ ൏ 0. From (A1) and (A4), we have: 
                           

0R
N R N
ddE E
di di


 
  ,                         

0N N R
N R N
dn n d
di di


 

  .                       
Since ݊ௌ ൌ 1 െ ݊ே െ ݊ி , we have: 
																																									݀݊ௌ݀݅ே ൌ െ
݀݊ே
݀݅ே െ
݀݊ி
݀݅ே ൌ
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ
݀߶ோ
݀݅ே െ
݀݊ி
݀݅ே .																																				ሺA8ሻ 
Substituting (A6) and (A7) into (A8), we next obtain: 
݀݊ௌ
݀݅ே ൌ െ
݊ி ൬߲߶ௌ߲݅ே ൰ ൜ܽி ൤݊ி ൅ ݊ௌ െ ߶ோ ൬
߲݊ே߲߶ோ൰൨ ൅
1
ߣ ൬
߲ܧ
߲߶ோ൰ ൅ ܽோ ൅ ܽௌ݊ௌൠ
|ܤ| ൏ 0. 
From (47), we have: 
 
S S SR
N R N N
d d
di di i
  

  

 



.                    (A9) 
Substituting (A6) into (A8) yields: 
݀߶ௌ
݀݅ே ൌ െ
1
|ܤ| ൬
߲߶ௌ
߲݅ܰ ൰ ൜ܾସ ൤ܽி݊ி ൅
1
ߣ ൬
߲ܧ
߲߶ோ൰ ൅ ܽோ൨ ൅ ܾଶ ൤݊ௌ െ ߶ோ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ൰൨ൠ ൏ 0. 
In order to examine the change in FDI intensity, we use (35) to derive: 
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   
N SF F F F F F
N S
R
N R R N N NF
dn dd d dn
di n d di di n di
     
  
     
  
                       
   
     
 

   
  
.     (A10) 
Equation (A10) indicates that the sign of ௗథಷௗ௜ಿ  is ambiguous.                        
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From (41), we have ܧே ൌ ቄܴܽሾఘሺ1െ݊ܵሻ൅݅ܰ߶ܴሿܮܰ ൅ 1ቅݓܰ. Thus, we can derive: 
	݀ܧே݀݅ே ൌ
ܽோݓே
ܮே ൤െߩ ൬
݀݊ௌ
݀݅ே൰ ൅ ߶ோ ൅ ݅ே ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅ே ൰൨ ൅ ቈ
ܽோሾߩሺ1 െ ݊ௌሻ ൅ ݅ே߶ோሻሿ
ܮே ൅ 1቉
݀ݓே
݀݅ே  
										ൌ ܽோݓேܮே ቊ൤െߩ൬
݀݊ௌ
݀݅ே൰ ൅ ߶ோ ൅ ݅ே ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅ே ൰൨ െ
ሼܽோሾߩሺ1 െ ݊ௌሻ ൅ ݅ே߶ோሻሿ ൅ ܮேሽሺߣ െ 1ሻ
ܽௌ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ேሻ ቋ 
										ൌ ܽோݓேܮே ቊ൤െߩ൬
݀݊ௌ
݀݅ே൰ ൅ ݅ே ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅ே ൰൨ ൅
߶ோሾܽௌ ൅ ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோሿ െ ሾܽோߩሺ1 െ ݊ௌሻ ൅ ܮேሿሺߣ െ 1ሻ
ܽௌ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ேሻ ቋ. 
                                                                        (B1) 
Since ௗ௡ೄௗ௜ಿ ൏ 0, 
ௗథೃ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0, and 0 ൏ 1 െ ݊ௌ ൏ 1, then 
ௗாಿ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0 if the following condition 
holds:  
																																																			߶ோሾܽௌ ൅ ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோሿ ൐ ሺߣ െ 1ሻሺܽோߩ ൅ ܮேሻ.																																	ሺB2ሻ 
The condition (B2) implies that: 
																																																														߶ோ ൐ ሺߣ െ 1ሻሺܽோߩ ൅ ܮேሻܽௌ ൅ ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோ .																																																					ሺB3ሻ 
The right-hand side of (B3) is smaller than 1 if ܽோ  is sufficiently large such that ܽோ ൐
ሺఒିଵሻ௅ಿି௔ೄ
ሺఒିଵሻሺଵିߩሻ . Because (A6) indicates that 
ௗథೃ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0, then (B3) can be satisfied if ݅ே and ܽோ are 
sufficiently large. Therefore, ௗாಿௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0 if ݅ே and ܽோ are sufficiently large. 
Using (39), we obtain: 
					ܷ݀ேሺ0ሻ݀݅ே ൌ
1
ߩ ൤
1
ܧே ൬
݀ܧே
݀݅ே ൰ ൅
݈݋݃ߣ
ߩ ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅ே ൰൨. 
Therefore, ௗ௎ಿሺ଴ሻௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0 if 
ௗாಿ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0 - that is, 
ௗ௎ಿሺ଴ሻ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0 if ݅ே and ܽோ are sufficiently large. 
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Since ܧௌ ൌ ாିாಿ௅ಿ௅ೄ , we have: 
/
1S N
N
N S N N
dE dEdE
di di d
L
L i
 
 
               

 

.             (B4) 
Because ௗாௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0, equation (B4) indicates that we are not able to determine the sign of 
ௗாೄ
ௗ௜ಿ when 
ௗாಿ
ௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0. Finally, we have: 
݀ ௌܷሺ0ሻ
݀݅ே ൌ
1
ߩ ൤
1
ܧௌ ൬
݀ܧௌ
݀݅ே൰ ൅
݈݋݃ߣ
ߩ ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅ே ൰൨. 
Because we are not able to determine the sign of ௗாೄௗ௜ಿ, then the sign of 
ௗ௎ೄሺ଴ሻ
ௗ௜ಿ  is ambiguous. 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
Proof of Proposition 3 
In this case, we have ߤி ൌ 1 and ߤோ ൌ ߤௌ ൌ 0. Equation (27) becomes: 
																																																			ܧሺ߶ோሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ
ߣ െ 1 ,																																																ሺC1ሻ 
with డாడథೃ ൌ
ா
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0. Equation (29) becomes:  
																																																																					ݓே ൌ ߣܽௌܽௌ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ.																																															ሺC2ሻ 
In this case, we have ߠ ൌ ߠሺ݅ௌሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻܽி ൅ ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃ௔ೄା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ with 
డఏ
డ௜ೄ ൌ ܽி. From (31), we obtain:  
																																								߶ௌሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ ቉ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ,																		ሺC3ሻ 
with డథೄడథೃ ൌ
థೄ
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డథೄ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄ௔ಷሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ൏ 0.  
Equation (32) becomes: 
																																																						݊ேሺ߶ோሻ ൌ ߣܧሺ߶ோሻ ሺܮே െ ܽோ߶ோሻ,																																									ሺC4ሻ 
where డ௡ಿడథೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డథೃቁ െ
ఒ௔ೃ
ா ൏0. 
 31
Totally differentiating (34) and (37) with respect to ߶ோ, ݊ி, and ݅ௌ yields:  
1
4
32
43
S
R
F
B
b b d
di
b b d
e
en
            
,                  (C5) 
where ݁ଷ ൌ ݊ிሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ ቀ߲థೄ߲݅ܵ ቁ ൏ 0 and ݁ସ ൌ ݊ி ቀ
߲థೄ
߲݅ܵ ቁ ൏ 0. Note that the matrix B is the same 
as the one in (A5) and the determinant of ܤ is negative.  
The effects of changes in ݅ௌ on ߶ோ and ݊ி are: 
																																																													݀߶ோ݀݅ௌ ൌ െ
ܾସ݁ଷ െ ܾଶ݁ସ
|ܤ| ,																																																			ሺC6ሻ 
																																																													݀݊ி݀݅ௌ ൌ െ
ܾଵ݁ସ െ ܾଷ݁ଷ
|ܤ| .																																																				ሺC7ሻ 
With a few steps of calculation, we obtain that ሺܾସ݁ଷ െ ܾଶ݁ସሻ ൌ െܽௌ߶ோ݊ி ቀ߲థೄ߲݅ܵ ቁ ൐ 0, indicating 
that ௗథೃௗ௜ೄ ൐ 0. With a few steps of calculation, we derive that: 
ሺܾଵ݁ସ െ ܾଷ݁ଷሻ ൌ െ݊ி ൬߲߶ௌ߲݅ܵ ൰ ൜ሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ ൤݊ௌ െ ߶ோ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ൰൨ ൅ ܽி݊ி ൅
1
ߣ ൬
߲ܧ
߲߶ோ൰ ൅ ܽோൠ ൐ 0. 
From (C7), we obtain ௗ௡ಷௗ௜ಿ ൐ 0.  
Note that as indicated by (45), ݓே is constant and is not affected by ݅ௌ. From (C1) and (C4), 
we have: 
                           

0R
RS S
ddE dE
di d di


 
  ,                         

0N N R
S SR
dn dn d
di d di


 
 .                       
Using (C6) and (C7), we can derive: 
														݀݊ே݀݅ௌ ൅
݀݊ி
݀݅ௌ ൌ െ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ
݀߶ோ
݀݅ௌ ൅
݀݊ி
݀݅ௌ ൰ 
																											ൌ ݊ி|ܤ| ൬
߲߶ௌ
߲݅ܵ ൰ ൜ܽௌ݊ௌ ൅ ܽி ൤݊ௌ െ ߶ோ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ൰൨ ൅ ܽி݊ி ൅
1
ߣ ൬
߲ܧ
߲߶ோ൰ൠ ൐ 0.	 
Then (36) indicates that 
																																																															݀݊ௌ݀݅ௌ ൌ െ൬
݀݊ே
݀݅ௌ ൅
݀݊ி
݀݅ௌ ൰ ൏ 0.																																												ሺC8ሻ 
From (40) we obtain:  
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 
S S S
S S S
R
R
d d
di di i
  

  

 



.                    (C9) 
Substituting (C6) into (C9) yields: 
݀߶ௌ
݀݅ௌ ൌ െ
1
|ܤ| ൬
߲߶ௌ
߲݅ܵ ൰ ൜ܾସ ൤ܽி݊ி ൅
1
ߣ ൬
߲ܧ
߲߶ோ൰ ൅ ܽோ൨ ൅ ܾଶ ൤݊ௌ െ ߶ோ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ൰൨ൠ ൏ 0. 
In order to examine the change in FDI intensity, we use (34) to derive: 
            
   
N SF F F F F F
S N S S
R
R R S F S
dn dd d dn
di n d di di n di
     
  
     
  
                       
   
     
 

   
  
.    (C10) 
Therefore, the sign of ௗథಷௗ௜ಿ ൏ 0 is ambiguous. 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
Proof of Proposition 4 
From (41), we have ܧே ൌ ቂܴܽఘሺ1െ݊ܵሻܮܰ ൅ 1ቃݓܰ. Equation (C2) indicates that ݓே is constant. We 
thus have: 
																																																															݀ܧே݀݅ௌ ൌ െ
ߩܽோݓே
ܮே ൬
݀݊ௌ
݀݅ே൰ ൐ 0.																																										ሺD1ሻ 
Using (39), (D1), and (C8) we obtain: 
																																																			ܷ݀ேሺ0ሻ݀݅ௌ ൌ
1
ߩ ൤
1
ܧே ൬
݀ܧே
݀݅ௌ ൰ ൅
݈݋݃ߣ
ߩ ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅ௌ ൰൨ ൐ 0.																								ሺD2ሻ 
Since ܧௌ ൌ ாିாಿ௅ಿ௅ೄ , we have: 

/
1S N
N
S S S S
LdE dEdE
di di diL
 
 
             
 

 

.              
Finally, we have: 
݀ ௌܷሺ0ሻ
݀݅ௌ ൌ
1
ߩ ൤
1
ܧௌ ൬
݀ܧௌ
݀݅ௌ ൰ ൅
݈݋݃ߣ
ߩ ൬
݀߶ோ
݀݅ௌ ൰൨. 
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Because we are not able to determine the sign of ௗாೄௗ௜ೄ , then the sign of 
ௗ௎ೄሺ଴ሻ
ௗ௜ೄ  is ambiguous. 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
Proof of Proposition 5 
This case corresponds to the parameter values with ߤௌ ൌ 1 and ߤோ ൌ ߤி ൌ 0. From (27), global 
expenditure becomes:	
																																						ܧሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ
ߣ െ 1 ,																																					ሺE1ሻ 
with డாడథೃ ൌ
ா
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డா
డ௜ೄ ൌ
ா
ଵା௜ೄ ൐ 0.  
Equation (29) becomes: 
																																																								ݓேሺ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ
ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ,																																						ሺE2ሻ 
with ௗ௪ಿௗ௜ೄ ൌ
ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ
ሾ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሿమ ൐ 0. Sine ݓே ൐ 1, then (E2) implies ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൐ ܽோ. 
In this case, we have ߠ ൌ ߠሺ݅ௌሻ ൌ ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ ൅
௔ಷ
ଵା௜ೄ  with 
డఏ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ఒ௔ೄమ௔ೃ
ሾ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሿమ െ
௔ಷ
ሺଵା௜ೄሻమ ൏ 0. Under the assumption that ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൐ ܽோ, we have: 
ߠሺ݅ௌሻ ൏ ߣܽௌܽோܽோ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ ൅
ܽிܽௌ
ܽோ ൌ
ܽௌሺܽோ ൅ ܽிሻ
ܽோ . 
From (31), we obtain:  
																										߶ௌሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሺ݅ௌሻ ቉ ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ,																																ሺE3ሻ 
with డథೄడథೃ ൌ
థೄ
ఘାథೃ ൐ 0 and 
డథೄ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
ሺఒିకሻ௔ೄሺఘାథೃሻ
ሺఒିଵሻఏమ ቀ
డఏ
డ௜ೄቁ ൐ 0.  
Equation (32) becomes: 
																																																			݊ேሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ൌ ߣܧሺ߶ோ; ݅ௌሻ ሺܮே െ ܽோ߶ோሻ,																																	ሺE4ሻ 
with డ௡ಿడథೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డథೃቁ െ
ఒ௔ೃ
ா ൏ 0 and 
డ௡ಿ
డ௜ೄ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ா ቀ
డா
డ௜ೄቁ ൏ 0.  
To examine the effects of an increase in ݅ௌ, we totally differentiate (34) and (37) with 
respect to ߶ோ, ݊ி, and ݅ௌ to obtain: 
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1
4
52
63
S
R
F
B
b b d
di
b b dn
e
e
             
,                 (E5) 
where ݁ହ ൌ ݊ிሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ ቀడథೄడ௜ೄ ቁ ൅
ଵ
ఒ ቀ
డா
డ௜ೄቁ ൐ 0  and ݁଺ ൌ ݊ி ቀ
డథೄ
డ௜ೄ ቁ ൅ ߶ோ ቀ
డ௡ಿ
డ௜ೄ ቁ . Note that the 
matrix B is the same as the one in (A5) and the determinant of ܤ is negative. The effects of 
changes in ݅ௌ on ߶ோ and ݊ி are: 
																																																																݀߶ோ݀݅ௌ ൌ െ
ܾସ݁ହ െ ܾଶ݁଺
|ܤ| ,																																																ሺE6ሻ 
																																																																݀݊ி݀݅ௌ ൌ െ
ܾଵ݁଺ െ ܾଷ݁ହ
|ܤ| .																																																ሺE7ሻ 
With a few steps of calculation, we can derive that:	
											ܾସ݁ହ െ ܾଶ݁଺ 
											ൌ െܽௌ߶ோ݊ி ቀడథೄడ௜ೄ ቁ ൅ ߶ோ ቀ
డ௡ಿ
డ௜ೄ ቁ ሾሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ߶ௌ ൅ ܽி߶ோሿ െ
ଵ
ఒ ቀ
డா
డ௜ೄቁ ሺ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሻ ൏ 0. 
Since |ܤ| ൏ 0, then (E6) indicates that ௗథೃௗ௜ೄ ൏ 0.  
In order to determine the sign of ௗ௡ಷௗ௜ೄ , we first prove the following Lemma. 
Lemma 1. డథೄడ௜ೄ ൐
థೄ
ଵା௜ೄ if ߦ is sufficiently large. 
Since ݓே ൐ 1, we have ଵ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻ ൐
ଵ
ఒ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻ. Thus, we have: 
																									߲߶ௌ߲݅ௌ ൌ െ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠଶ ൬
߲ߠ
߲݅ௌ൰ 
																																	ൌ െ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ߶ௌߠሾሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሿ ൬
߲	ߠ
߲݅ௌ൰ 
													ൌ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ߶ௌߠሾሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሿ ቊ
ߣܽௌଶܽோ
ሾܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻሿଶ ൅
ܽி
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻଶቋ 
																																	൐ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ߶ௌߠሾሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሿ
ߣܽௌଶܽோ
ሾܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻሿଶ 
																																൐ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ߶ௌߠሾሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሿ
ߣܽௌଶܽோ
ሾߣܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻሿଶ 
																																	ൌ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ߶ௌߠሾሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሿ
ܽௌܽோ
ߣሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻଶ. 
Then డథೄడ௜ೄ ൐
థೄ
ଵା௜ೄ if: 
																																	ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌܽோ ൐ ߠሾሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሿߣሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ.																										ሺE8ሻ 
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Since ߠ ൏ ௔ೄሺ௔ೃା௔ಷሻ௔ೃ , then the inequality of (E8) will hold if:  
																											ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌܽோ ൐ ܽௌሺܽோ ൅ ܽிሻܽோ ሾሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻߠሿߣሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ.																 
That is, 
												ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽௌܽோ 
൐ ܽௌሺܽோ ൅ ܽிሻܽோ ൜ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻ ൤
ߣܽௌܽோ
ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ ൅
ܽி
1 ൅ ݅ௌ൨ൠ ߣሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ. 
                                                                      (E9) 
The inequality of (E9) will hold if: 
		ሺߣ െ ߦሻ	ܽோ ൐
ሺܽோ ൅ ܽிሻܽௌ
ܽோ ൤ߣ െ ߦ െ ሺߣ െ 1ሻ
ߣܽோ
ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ൨ ߣሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ. 
That is, 
																				ܽோଶ ൐ ሺܽோ ൅ ܽிሻܽௌ ൤1 െ ߣ െ 1ߣ െ ߦ
ߣܽோ
ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ ൅ ܽோሺߣ െ 1ሻ൨ ߣሺ1 ൅ ݅ௌሻ.																ሺE10ሻ 
The inequality of (E10) will hold if ߦ is sufficiently large. 
 
We now go back to consider the sign of ௗ௡ಷௗ௜ೄ . Note that: 
																													ܾଵ݁଺ െ ܾଷ݁ହ
ൌ ݊ிሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ ൜െ݊ௌ ൬߲߶ௌ߲݅ܵ ൰ ൅ ߶ோ ൤൬
߲߶ௌ
߲݅ܵ ൰ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ൰ െ ൬
߲߶ௌ
߲߶ோ൰ ൬
߲݊ே
߲݅ௌ ൰൨ൠ
െ ߩ݊ௌߣሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻ ൬
߲ܧ
߲݅ௌ൰ െ ܽி݊ி ൤൬
߲߶ௌ
߲݅ܵ ൰ ݊ி ൅ ൬
߲݊ே
߲݅ௌ ൰߶ோ൨ െ
݊ி
ߣ ൬
߲ܧ
߲߶ோ൰ ൬
߲߶ௌ
߲݅ܵ ൰
െ ܽோ ቈ൬߲߶ௌ߲݅ܵ ൰ ݊ி ൅
߶ோሺ1 െ ݊ேሻ
1 ൅ ݅ௌ ቉.																																																																		 
Because డ௡ಿడథೃ ൏ 0, then under the assumption of 
డ߶ܵ
డ௜ೄ ൐
߶ܵ
ଵା௜ೄ, we have: 
൬߲߶ௌ߲݅ܵ ൰ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ோ൰ െ ൬
߲߶ௌ
߲߶ோ൰ ൬
߲݊ே
߲݅ௌ ൰ ൏ െ
߶ௌ
1 ൅ ݅ܵ ൬
݊ே
ߩ ൅ ߶ோ ൅
ߣܽோ
ܧ ൰ ൅
߶ௌ݊ே
ሺߩ ൅ ߶ோሻሺ1 ൅ ݅ܵሻ 
ൌ െ ߶ௌߣܽோሺ1 ൅ ݅ܵሻܧ ൏ 0. 
Since డாడథೃ ൐ 0, 
డா
డ௜ೄ ൐ 0, 
డథೄ
డ௜ೄ ൐ 0, and 
డ߶ܵ
డ௜ೄ ൐
߶ܵ
ଵା௜ೄ, then we have: 
		ܾଵ݁଺ െ ܾଷ݁ହ ൏ െܽி݊ி ൤൬߲߶ௌ߲݅ܵ ൰ ݊ி ൅ ൬
߲݊ே
߲݅ௌ ൰߶ோ൨ െ
ܽோ߶ோሺ1 െ ݊ேሻ
1 ൅ ݅ௌ 														 
൏ െܽி݊ி ൬	߶ௌ݊ி1 ൅ ݅ܵ െ
߶ோ݊ே
1 ൅ ݅ܵ൰ െ
ܽோ߶ோሺ1 െ ݊ேሻ
1 ൅ ݅ௌ  
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ൌ െܽி݊ிሺ	߶ௌ݊ி െ ߶ோ݊ேሻ ൅ ܽோ߶ோሺ݊ௌ ൅ ݊ிሻ1 ൅ ݅ௌ  
																																												൏ െܽி݊ிሺ	߶ௌ݊ி െ ߶ோ݊ேሻ ൅ ܽோ߶ோ݊ி1 ൅ ݅ௌ . 
Using (18), we have: 
																														ܾଵ݁଺ െ ܾଷ݁ହ ൏ െܽி݊ி
ሺ߶ோ݊ௌ െ ߶ோ݊ேሻ ൅ ܽோ߶ோ݊ி
1 ൅ ݅ௌ  
																																																					ൌ െ݊ி߶ோሾܽிሺ݊ௌ െ ݊ேሻ ൅ ܽோሿ1 ൅ ݅ௌ  
																																																						ൌ ݊ி߶ோሾܽிሺ݊ே െ ݊ௌሻ െ ܽோሿ1 ൅ ݅ௌ . 
Because ݊ே െ ݊ௌ ൏ 1 and 0 ൏ ߶ௌ ൏ 1, we obtain: 
																																																			ܾଵ݁଺ െ ܾଷ݁ହ ൏ ݊ி߶ோሺܽி െ ܽோሻ1 ൅ ݅ௌ . 
Thus, ܾଵ݁଺ െ ܾଷ݁ହ ൏ 0  if ܽி ൏ ܽோ . Since |ܤ| ൏ 0 , we have ௗ௡ಷௗ௜ೄ ൏ 0  if ܽோ ൐ ܽி  and 
డ߶ܵ
డ௜ೄ ൐
߶ܵ
ଵା௜ೄ. 
Equation (E2) indicates that ௗ௪ಿௗ௜ೄ ൌ
ఒ௔ೄ௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻ
ሾ௔ೄሺଵା௜ೄሻା௔ೃሺఒିଵሻሺଵା௜ಿሻሿమ ൐ 0, implying that an increase 
in ݅ௌ will raise ݓே . To examine how changes in ݅ௌ  affect the rate of imitation, we totally 
differentiate (E3) with respect to ݅ௌ and have: 
 
S S S
S S S
R
R
d d
di di i
  

  

 



.                    (E11) 
Substituting (E6) into (E11) and using డథೄడ௜ೄ ൐
థೄ
ଵା௜ೄ, then we obtain: 
݀߶ௌ
݀݅ௌ ൐ െ
1
|ܤ|
߶ௌ
1 ൅ ݅ܵ ሼሺ߶ோ ൅ ߶ௌሻሺܽி݊ி ൅ ܽோሻ ൅ ሾሺܽௌ ൅ ܽிሻ߶ௌ ൅ ܽி߶ோሿ݊ܵሽ ൐ 0. 
This indicates that the rate of imitation will increase with a rise in the Southern nominal 
interest rate. 
From (E1) and (E4), we have: 
                          
 
/
S
R
SR S
ddE E E
di di i


  
 

 


,                         
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 
/
N N NR
R NS S
dn n nd
di di i


  
 
 
 

.                       
Therefore, an increase in ݅ௌ causes ambiguous effects on the global expenditure and the extent of 
Northern production, leading to an ambiguous effect on the extent of Southern production.  
From (34), we derive that: 
               
   
?
/
R
R
S NF F F F F F
S S N S FR R S
dnd d dn
di n d di n di
     
   
    
 
          
        

.    
Since the sign of ௗ௡ಿௗ௜ೄ  is ambiguous, then we are not able to determine the sign of 
ௗథಷ
ௗ௜ೄ .  
 
